Washington Insider

The United States has been an exception among major world powers by continuing to experience robust population growth and a younger population than most of its global competitors in the 21^st century. Russia, China, Japan, Germany, Italy, and others are all experiencing a shrinking of their total population sizes and a rapid growth of the percentage of their populations aged 65 and over. The U.S. is now heading in the direction of slower population growth and more rapid population aging—a trend that is projected to intensify in the decades ahead and that marks a huge contrast to the American experience to date.  

The U.S. could learn from how rapidly aging countries in Europe and Asia have begun to adjust to their changing demographics, both their successes and continued challenges. More robust development and adoption of labor-saving technologies and more flexible military recruiting practices are areas where the U.S. could learn from its aging allies and adversaries. Among their missteps that the U.S. should avoid is putting off to the distant future policies to address deficit spending and too-early retirement ages. 

Beginning during the Covid-19 pandemic and intensifying under the second Trump administration, U.S. population growth slowed due to a combination of fewer babies being born and fewer immigrants. The first six months of 2025 saw the first drop in the U.S. immigrant population since the 1960s, down around 1.4 million people due to a combination of immigrant decisions to leave the U.S., fewer arrivals, and aggressive deportations of undocumented and reclassified immigrants. This demographic shift of slower population growth—and the more rapid population aging that results—will affect a wide range of U.S. power resources and societal dynamics, eroding an advantage the U.S. has silently enjoyed vis-à-vis nearly every other world power apart from India. 

The growth and rate of aging of populations around the world have changed dramatically since the last century when nearly every nation was growing and youth bulges fueled economic growth and, at times, wars and civil unrest. In the 21st century, only parts of South Asia and Africa are expected to see large population increases, with much of the rest of the world facing the consequences of larger numbers of older residents and fewer workers. The combined populations of Russia, China, and Japan are projected to see over 200 million fewer residents in the next 25 years and an even larger decline in their working-age populations. Meanwhile, the United States had been projected to grow its population by over 35 million in that same period—but this will likely now be less due to a combination of reduced immigration and a lower national birthrate. These changes will lead the U.S. to hit “super-aged” status, where 20% or more of its population is aged 65+, sooner than expected with implications for the solvency of the Social Security retirement system, economic growth rates, and military recruiting, among many policy areas. According to 2024 population statistics, the United States is projected to reach super-aged status in 2029. 

Many U.S. allies and principal adversaries have been facing the dual challenges of working-age population shrinkage and a growing percentage of their populations aged 65+ for several years now. Japan became the world’s first super-aged society back in 2005. U.S. security partners South Korea and Taiwan reached that milestone in 2025, while China and Russia are projected to reach super-aged status in the early 2030s. 

New technologies and greater cooperation among allies and partners are two ways that the United States and its allies can together manage the coming demographic transition among the major powers. As widely noted in the media, artificial intelligence (AI) and other forms of automation are already reshaping labor markets, helping aging and population-shrinking powers achieve more with less. However, these technologies also are creating many new security challenges that require human labor and innovative ideas to address, such as the proliferation of cyber-threats and uncrewed drones. 

One surprise to many related to countries with shrinking workforces is that growth in total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is still projected in these advanced economies, even with shrinking working-age populations and larger numbers of retirees due to new technologies and better-trained workers. This growth will help aging powers like Japan and South Korea pay for technological offsets for more expensive, and likely smaller, military forces. Unfortunately, the same is true for America’s aging adversaries—including Russia, China, and North Korea. Also unfortunately, America’s allies will hit critical aging milestones before America’s aging adversaries. 

In my latest book, Asia’s Aging Security, I closely examine 16 territories in the Indo-Pacific region—shrinking and rapidly aging major powers as well as still-growing and more youthful rising powers—to show how differential demographic change will affect America’s network of military partners and regional security institutions as well as aging adversaries. With new policies and statistics from 2025 suggesting that the United States will age more quickly and grow its population more slowly than expected even just a few years ago, it is even more incumbent on the United States and its partners to learn from each other about how to adjust to new population trends and to work together to develop new technological and cooperative solutions to both regional and global challenges. 

 One positive is that U.S. allies and partners are among the most technologically advanced countries in the world—and many already have developed ways to address some of the negative consequences of their rapidly aging populations. For example, advanced sensors have been used to reduce the need for human sentries, and remotely piloted aircraft allow for aviators of differing physical standards to contribute to national defense. Women also have been recruited in greater numbers to offset the declining number of males of recruiting age—though the U.S. already has higher rates of female service than most of its Indo-Pacific allies.  

Other U.S. allies and partners are among the smaller subset of still-growing and more youthful populations, such as U.S. ally the Philippines and rising power India. Australia also is projected to continue to grow while becoming super-aged, like the U.S. itself. That we have seen increased security-related cooperation with such countries is not surprising given their more favorable demographics—though numerous obstacles to closer cooperation remain with these and other partners.  

The war between Russia and Ukraine has shown that 21st century conflict among advanced military powers will include both “old-school” direct contact between soldiers as well as new forms of fighting which utilize new technologies that are changing the nature of warfare. U.S. military planning rightly seeks to prepare for both scenarios. Networking U.S. partnerships with both rapidly aging and more slowly aging populations is one way to address America’s unexpectedly accelerating population aging phenomenon. Learning best practices from aging allies is another.  

For human beings, while aging often conjures up images of frailty and weakness, age also can bring wisdom, wealth, and the benefit of deep networks of support. In the case of countries, enhanced cooperation and shared development of new technologies can help maintain U.S. strength despite crossing the threshold into super-aged status later this decade.